Excerpts from: Cozzens, Jeffrey B. Ranstorp, Magnus. “The enduring Al-Qaeda
threat: a network perspective” Contemporary Debates in Terrorism. pp. 94-96.
Al-Qaeda has provided its rank-and-file with both tangible
and intangible boons. While many of the perceived personal 'benefits' of jihad
and martyrdom for jihadi activists are described elsewhere (Wiktorowicz and
Kaltenthaler, 2006), there are multiple profits that extend to the collective
level that should be considered in an assessment of network viability. These accomplishments
function as a bonding agent, essential to safeguard the network's internal commitment,
persistence and attractiveness.
Collectively, AQ has provided its activists with a number of
tangible accomplishments. However, perhaps none resonate as profoundly as the
11 September attacks. The fact that Ground Zero in New York City remains under
construction testifies to the fact that Al-Qaeda was able to project power at a
scale once held as the sole domain of states. As
polling data indicated in 2003, the attacks catalyzed deep admiration for AQ"
corners of the majority Muslim world, even if this has since dwindled (Few
Center for the People and the Press, 2003).
As al-Qirshi (2002) argues, the attacks demonstrated that
the 'martyrdom operations of a few were sufficient to accomplish what the
Soviet Union had been unable to achieve during the Cold War. Moreover, they
exposed the 'hypocrisy and the tawagheef ('false gods') in the majority Muslim
world, sparked a conflict that exposed 'Jewish and Crusader' ambitions in
countries like Afghanistan and Iraq and revived the 'neglected obligation' of
defending Muslims and their lands (al-Qirshi, 2002). We see evidence of these
perceived benefits in the testimonies of individuals who became jihadi
activists following 9/11 and subsequent coalition actions, and in fact, in
direct video testimony from AQ itself in the weeks following the attack
(Michael and Wahba, 2001).
Further, history tells us that we should not overlook AQ's
ability to withstand a full frontal assault from coalition forces for a decade
in the same area where the storied mujahideen confronted the Soviets. If the
Arab Afghans' fight against the Soviets became the stuff of legends in jihadi
circles, how could AQ's resiliency and survival in the face of a determined international
coalition be seen as anything but an omen of divine favor and confirmation of their
cause (Cozzens, 2009b)? Periodic operational highlights, from the 2005 London
attacks to Humam al-Bawlawi's December 30, 2009 attack against US intelligence
personnel at Camp Chapman - even if not on the scale of the 9/11 attacks - are
thus conceived as mile markers on the road to inevitable victory (Brinkbaumer
and Goetz, 2010). Moreover, it should be remembered that even failed plots such
as the foiled bombing of air cargo flights originating: from Yemen are spun as
strategic and propaganda victories by AQ media outlets (Ibrahim, 2010).
Finally, AQ ideologues such as the late Yusuf al-Uyayree
spare no effort to highlight the network's alternative metrics of victory
(al-Uyayree, n. d.). These are designed to strengthen resolve for AQ|s
activists when progress on strategic objectives may appear stalled, and cement
unity of purpose in combatting AQ's enemies (Cozzens, 2009a).
Finally, the inspirational impact and promotion of AQ's
jihadi combat veterans (sometimes called ghazis in the English language jihadi
literature, meaning 'warrior' or 'raider') on retaining and attracting other
militants cannot be overlooked. The British AQ militant behind the infamous
'Gas Limos' plot, Dhiren Barot, wrote: 'Simply interacting with ghazis . . .
can help to alter one's outlook and influence oneself to procure a taste for
this noble path in their blood, making it akin to their nature' (al-Hindi,
1999). The authors developed this point further in a 2010 publication on
jihadist foreign fighters (Cilluffo, Cozzens and Ranstorp, 2010: 32). It is
difficult to overlook the ghazi paradigm as a critical component of AQ's
retention and mobilization strategy (Yousafzai and Moreau, 2010).
AQ possesses all of the characteristics of a network built
for survival. It leverages its manpower and geographic scope to mobilize, and
fosters an organizational identity and culture that yields committed
operatives. Its network components also work synergistically towards common
goals. Further, beyond the personal benefits of martyrdom and jihad, AQ can
claim collective tangible and intangible accomplishments, It also appears to
maintain a systematic plan for key leader replacement, and promotes jihadi archetypes
like the ghazi as a means to build depth in numbers. Based on the social
science research concerned with network advancement, our brief assessment
suggests that the AQ network is indeed viable. And if the AQ_ network is
viable, it is logically a threat to the international community. But what form
will the threat take?
First, most Western analysis struggles to accurately
conceptualize other cultures, high-context societies or the nature of the
threat from AQ. When speaking of AQ’s future threat, different concepts of time
and space are involved between the network and its enemies (us), and
alternative perceptions reign concerning how war is made and how winning is
understood (Ranstorp, 2008). These differences are compounded by the countless definitions
of 'threat' that litter the security studies lexicon, and multiple, even
competing strategic visions within A Q_ itself. Critical differences exist in
societal, tactical and strategic thinking across cultures - and often between our
understanding of AQ and the network's own self-conceptions. This paradigmatic
contrast between the West and AQ has been described as 'functionalism' pitted
against 'culturalism' (Cozzens, 2006).
Second, while difficult to pinpoint, the AQ_ threat will continue
to shock and surprise, given the complexity of its internal dynamics, history
of scalable wildcard operations and the tremendous difficulties inherent to
predicting precise forms of such sudden, violent and often game-changing
eruptions. Indeed, there are limits to inductive reasoning when considering the
possibilities of large, sudden and unexpected shocks to the international
system, what have been described variously as 'Black Swans' or 'Wild Cards'
(Ranstorp, 2008; Taleb, 2007). US Army Major Nidal Hasan's shooting rampage is
indicative of the sudden and unexpected nature of this threat, as are the
often-surprising provocations that fuel it, such as the Danish Muhammad
cartoons controversy.
Finally, despite the inherent difficulty of conceptualizing
the holistic AQ threat, the international community can be assured that the
future will consist not only of kinetic attacks, but also strikes designed to
fray social and economic cohesion along pre-existing lines within targeted
societies - especially during a time when Western intelligence and military
resource are stretched thin. This AQ strategy already targets the United States
and European Union countries, as is discussed at great length in the jihadi
literature, and is being violently played out in 'fault-line' conflicts in
places like Pakistan, Iraq and Somalia.
Hoffman's erudite 2010 assessment in the Washington Post
poignantly highlights this theme: 'Al-Qaeda's newfound vitality is the product
of a fresh strategy that plays to its networking strength ... In contrast to
its plan on Sept. 11, which was to deliver a knock-out blow to the United
States, al-Qaeda's leadership has now adopted a "death by a thousand
cuts'" approach' (Hoffman, 2010).
Cozzens, Jeffrey B. Ranstorp, Magnus. “The enduring Al-Qaeda threat: a network perspective” Conteporary Debates in Terrorism. pp. 94-96.
