Counterterrorism : Elements involved in its strategies

1. dissuading individuals from joining terrorist groups
2. dissuading groups from using terrorism
3. reducing the capability of terrorist groups
4. erecting physical defences against terrorist attacks
5. mitigating the effects of attacks

Reducing terrorist capabilities in turn requires the use of several instruments, including diplomacy, intelligence, financial controls, criminal justice systems, military force.

Covert Actions - the Dilemma

Covert actions can be seen as problematic and it is often linked to neo-imperialism. Chalmers Johnson, a respected political economist, has deployed the CIA term ‘blowback’ to denote the unintended consequences of covert actions that were deliberately kept from the American public. He also uses the CIA as a primary exhibit in his argument about the scale of covert political interference and economic imperialism in the world. For Johnson, many of America’s current difficulties in the global south stem from vexatious retaliations against CIA’s activities that ironically the American public knows little about. The removal of a democratic regime in Iran and the installation of the Shah in 1953 is an obvious example. Noam Chomsky argues that the majority of covert action has focused on subverting democracies in the Third World, typically by secretly funneling money to preferred candidates. (Johnson 2000, Chomsky and Otero 2003).

Aldrich, Richard J. "Intelligence" in Williams, Paul D.  Security Studies: an Introduction. pp. 242-243. 

Notes

Notes:

Intelligence services increasingly regard themselves as action-oriented, or as one former practitioner has put it, they are now 'hunters not gatherers' (Cogan 2004).

Cogan, Charles (2004), 'Hunters not gatherers: Intelligence in the twenty-first century', Intelligence and National Security. 19(2): 304-21.

Key partners are often the domestic security agencies of the global south rather than other foreign intelligence services (Lander 2004, Jones 2006).

Lander, Stephen (2004), 'International intelligence co-operation: An inside perspective', Cambridge Reviw of International Studies, 17(3): 481-93.

Jones, Garrett (2006), 'It's a cultural thing: Thoughts on a troubled CIA', Orbis, 50(1): 23-40.

Countries that appear to be barely on speaking terms are often the closest intelligence partners (Rees and Aldrich 2005). In recent years, the USA has worked with security agencies of both Libya and Sudan.

Rees, Wyn and Richard J. Aldrich (2005), 'Contending cultures of counterterrorism: Transatlantic divergence or convergence?' International Affairs, 81(5): 905-25.

Studies on 'Surprise attack' and 'Perception'

Studies on ‘surprise’

Barton Whaley published a path-breaking study of Hitler’s surprise attack on the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. The study sought to draw out many of the important psychological aspects of both surprise for the victim and the strategies used by the aggressor to achieve effective deception. Whaley sought to distil the concept of ‘stratagem’ that placed considerable emphasis on the art of surprise and deception as a component of statecraft (Whaley 1973, 2007)

In 1978, Richard Betts published a sophisticated comparative analysis of surprise attack. He asked why surprise attacks succeed so often, despite the existence of elaborate intelligence communities. Betts argued that weak collection of raw data – in other words, inadequate field espionage – was rarely the cause of failure. Instead, the main culprits fell into three categories:

1.      Bureaucratic dysfunction

2.      Psychological perception issues or ‘cognitive dissonance’

3.      Excessive political interference by policy-makers

Betts conceptualize the intelligence process as a long chain, arguing that mechanistic efforts to improve one part of the intelligence process only resulted in the chain pulling apart another weak spot.

Betts famously concluded that ‘intelligence failures are inevitable’ (Betts 1978).

Betts’ work was paralleled by Michael Handel, who argued that these problems could be viewed as a series of paradoxes.

Studies on ‘perception’

In 1977, Robert Jervis published one of the first major works in the realm of international relations to take intelligence seriously, entitled Perception and Misconception in International Politics. It suggested that perceptions matter and that quite often states that develop a hostile image of their opponents will interpret information to fit that fixed image, leading to unnecessary conflict over minor issues. Jervis began to ask where these ‘images’ come from and how this related to intelligence. It suggested that intelligence analysts could be trained to avoid some of the perception problems (Jervis 1977: 25, 74, 172).

Aldrich, Richard J. "Intelligence" in Williams, Paul D.  Security Studies: an Introduction. pp. 228-239.

Different views towards intelligence failures

Aldrich, Richard J. "Intelligence" in Williams, Paul D. Security Studies: an Introduction. p. 240.

Pessimistic	Richard Betts, 2007	Policy-makers should simply revise their expectations downwards, attributing current disappointment to unrealistic demands. Sees intelligence as ‘tragic’
Methodological	Robert Jervis, 2010	Too much has been expected of intelligence and partly for this reason he argues that pre-emption is weak doctrine. Good political science methods would help analysts avoid some of their more lamentable errors.
Optimistic	Amy Zegart, 2007	Meaningful reform is possible and has attributed recent difficulties to a kind of institutional arteriosclerosis that obstructs substantial change.
Domestic	Gregory Treverton, 2011	Optimistic about structural change, but points out the greatest challenge lie in the controversial area of domestic intelligence.
Iconoclastic	Dana Priest and Bill Arkin, 2011	Argue that the expansion of intelligence and security agencies has resulted in a sprawling and ineffective system that is both unaccountable and unsustainable.

Trends & changes in Intelligence

Aldrich, Richard J. "Intelligence" in Williams, Paul D. Security Studies: an Introduction. pp. 235-236.

Recent debates over intelligence have taken two forms. The first is what we might call an old fashioned ‘value for money’ argument about intelligence failures.

Trends in Terrorism

Since 1990, there have been a number of developments in terrorism and political violence that are likely to be significant in the longer term.

Terrorism and insurgency

The practice of employing regime termination as a major response to terrorism produced a complex reaction that effectively mixes terrorism and insurgency. This evolved in Afghanistan and Iraq into a form of warfare that may be concentrated in the two countries concerned but has a much wider impact, not least in Pakistan and in terms of support for the al-Qa’ida movement and its associates.

Al-Qa’ida (Al-Qaeda)’s agenda – post 9/11

Al-Qa’ida, the group responsible for the 9/11 attacks, is a movement dispersed and very broadly based movement that is not narrowly hierarchical, but does have clear aims and intentions. It is not a nihilistic collection of insane extremists, as frequently presented in the media, but a rational movement involving an unusual combination of revolutionary political fervor rooted in a fundamentalist orientation of a major religion – Islam – rather than in a political ideology or nationalist base.

The movement has its theoretical origins in the writings of a number of radical Islamic thinkers, notably the Egyptian Sayidd Qutb.

In more practical terms, al-Qa’ida can be traced back to the success of the Mujahiddin fights in Afghanistan and their opposition to Soviet occupation in the 1980s.

Following the eviction of the Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991, substantial US military forces remained in the area, including Saudi Arabia. This revitalized the previous anti-foreign movement of the 1980s that focused on evicting foreign ‘crusader’ forces from Saudi Arabia. Central to this were two men. One was Osama Bin Laden. The other was the Egyptian-born strategist Ayman al-Zawahiri.

During the 1990s, the movement developed a more comprehensive strategy, rooted largely in Qutb’s ideas of a revival of ‘true’ Islam following its corruption by western culture.

By the end of 20^th century, Al-Qa’ida had developed a number of short-term aims together with an over-arching long-term vision:

1. The eviction of US military forces from Saudi Arabia, an aim that the movement claimed to have achieved by 2005 when the last of the major US bases in the Kingdom was evacuated.
2. The eviction of foreign forces from the Islamic world.
3. The replacement of the House of Saud by a 'genuine' Islamist regime as the Saudi royal family is seen as corrupt elitist and excessively linked to the US.
4. The replacement of other corrupt, pro-western regimes across the Middle East, with an initial focus on Egypt and Pakistan but extending to Iraq and Afghanistan.
5. The elimination of the Zionist state of Israel and support for the Palestinian cause.
6. The support for other Islamist movements across the world, such as the Chechen rebels.

Beyond these lay the long-term aim of establishing an Islamic Caliphate in the Middle East but extending to other parts of the world.

Rogers, Paul. "Terrorism" in Williams, Paul D. Security Studies: an Introduction. pp.228-229.

Using the Bible and Christian Tradition in Theological Reflection

Using the Bible and Christian Tradition in Theological Reflection by Roger Walton

(The Wesley Study Centre, Durham, UK)

Since about 1970, there has been a growing interest in the notion of 'theological reflection' in a variety of Christian and theological education spheres and in Church-related discourse. The literature on the subject has grown exponentially in these 30 years, though as the Dutch Theologian Johannes van der Ven points out it has not necessarily led to a clarity about the subject:

伊斯蘭對歐洲的影響 Islam in Europe

雖然在法國遊客區，看不見宏大的清真寺，但從北非而來的人口多達五百萬，伊斯蘭是法國的第二大宗教已是不爭的事實．由於法國曾統治北非一些國家，如阿爾及利亞，蘇丹等，故在六，七十年代，這些廉價勞工大量移入法國，他們沒有意圖在法國根植，也沒有想過要大興土木，花錢在法國建清真寺，今日的法國人，也因以前曾統治過這些非洲的伊斯蘭國，曾把大量西方文化所帶進非洲去，今天眼看昔是自己國家的殖民，要在自己的土地上建宏大清真寺，輸入發揚他們的文化，當然心裏不是味兒，反之倒有點被征服的感覺，故此大多數都會強烈反對．

沙達被殺之因 Egypt

談到原教旨主義運動和組織，就不能忽略埃及的穆斯林兄弟會了，穆斯林兄弟會早在1926年成立，1952年在推翻舊皇朝的革命中，他也是其中的支持者．可惜未被新政府納賽視為一政黨，又因新政府走向世俗主義．穆斯林兄弟會很快便與他們決裂．甚至在 1954年他們在一公共場合上行刺納賽失敗，納賽採嚴厲措施．處決他們六名領袖，且把千多名成員下獄．其他成員只有逃到鄰國沙地阿拉伯和約旦去．在納賽政府嚴密壓制下．到五，六十年代，穆斯林兄弟會在埃及的勢力幾乎完全被瓦解．

More models of theological reflections

All of the models are variations on what is usually called 'the Pastoral Cycle.' They all employ an 'action-reflection' model of adult learning. Whilst different models use slightly different labels, the basic steps of the reflection process are reasonably clear.

However, the simplicity of the diagrams should not disguise the fact that real challenges have to be faced if the reflection is to become, genuinely theological. Each model assumes that the person or group engaged in reflection will have a reasonable working knowledge of the Bible and Christian theology. Without such a familiarity with the Bible and theology, it becomes more difficult to 'make connections', and to develop a Christian perspective on various topics.

Theology as a three-way conversation. Theological reflection clearly begins in the 'culture' circle, by reflecting upon human experience, within the context of contemporary culture. Such reflections take on a theological dimension as we listen to, and interact with, the voices of Scripture and the Great Tradition of the Christian faith.

Further material about theological reflection can be found in:

Laurie Green Let's Do Theology (London: Mowbray, 1990).

Paul Ballard and John Pritchard, Practical Theology in Action (London: SPCK, 20062), chapters 6 to11.

Stephen Pattison, 'Some Straw for the Bricks: A Basic Introduction to Theological Reflection,' in

James Woodward and Stephen Pattison, (eds), The Blackwell Reader in Pastoral and Practical Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 135-145.

Defining Terrorism

'The threat of violence and the use of fear to coerce, persuade, and gain public attention' (NACCJSG 1976)

'Political terrorism is the use, or threat of use, of violence by an individual or a group whether acting for or in opposition to established authority, when such action is designed to create extreme anxiety and/or fear-inducing effects in a target group larger than the immediate victims with the purpose of coercing that group into acceding to the political demands of the perpetrators.'
(Wardlaw 1982: 16)

'Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.'
(US Department of State 2001: 13)

The one fundamental difference between the definition given by Wardlaw and that used by the US government in that the latter is concerned with sub-state actors, even if they may be supported by a state, whereas Wardlaw's definition embraces the actions of the state against its own population.

Williams, Paul D. Ed. Security Studies: An Introduction. pp.223-224/

An expanded model of theological reflection

This theological reflection model is an enlarged and expanded version of the previous two models, which tries to make explicit some of the things which are implicit within the earlier models.

Description 

At the outset the important thing is to describe an experience in your own words. It may be your own experience or someone else’s experience. It may the experience of an individual or a group.

Describe what happened and describe the feelings and emotions which this provokes within you.

Discussion 

Now you begin to discuss some of the issues raised by this experience. Identify as many of the issues as possible. Ask as many questions about it as you want to. Most, if not all, experiences are complex affairs, and something of that complexity is likely to come to the surface as you begin to probe and ask questions about an experience. To begin with it may be useful simply to ‘brainstorm’ a whole list of questions. This may leave you with a long and untidy list of questions. Having identified those questions, it will then be useful to begin to organise them into groups, and to write a brief paragraph on each of the major topics you have identified. The aim at this stage is not to offer solutions but to demonstrate your awareness of the complexity of issues raised by this experience.

Debate 

It is very tempting to fast forward the process and to offer Christian answers to the questions prematurely. One way of slowing the process down a bit is to debate alternative points of view. It may be helpful to consider how people outside the church might react to this situation. Similarly in a multi-faith society, it may also be important to think about the sorts of questions which people of other faiths might bring to this debate.

Decide 

If you have worked through the earlier stages of the process, you will have produced a lengthy list of issues and questions. Recognizing that many issues will be interrelated, it will not be possible to explore all, or many of them, in depth at the same time. Therefore, at this point it is vital to decide which of those issues you will explore on this occasion. Within the "Four A’s" model, it is assumed that you will select one topic for more detailed discussion before moving into the Application stage. This model makes the need for such a choice more explicit. The Reflection Spiral addresses this issue in another way, by suggesting that one cycle of reflection provides the launching pad for further cycles reflecting on more of the issues.

Dialogue 

At this point it is essential to engage in a serious dialogue with Scripture and with the Grand Tradition of the Christian Church. Bible, doctrine, church history, worship and prayer are some of the resources you may want to draw upon at this stage.

Develop 

Arising out of this process of dialogue, it may become possible to develop new insights. Are there new ways in which your understanding of God, and of the ways in which He works, need to be developed? Or have you come to a better informed understanding of why Christians believe certain things as a result of the process of theological reflection?

Discipleship 

Theological reflection is not a theoretical exercise, but it is meant to issue in action. So, in what ways can you translate these ideas into practice? What are the practical implications of your reflections for your Christian discipleship?

Devotion 

A reminder and an invitation to offer your thoughts, reflections and decisions to God in prayer and

worship. Prayer is not an afterthought which we add onto the process, but a vital ingredient

throughout the process of theological reflection.

The beauty of the "Four A’s" model of reflection is its brevity and simplicity. However, many students have used this expanded model and found it a useful way of structuring their thoughts. This expanded model can also be used profitably in a group setting; by getting groups of people to work together, specifically at the Discussion, Dialogue and Discipleship stages. The person leading the group handles the feedback from the group discussions and then helps people to move through the other stages of the cycle. So, for example, the group leader will gather together some of the key questions raised in the Discussion stage, before enabling the group to make a Decision about which issue will be explored in greater depth.

The 4 'A's Model of Theological Reflection

Models of theological reflection are not intended to be straightjackets, which force us to explore complicated topics by moving through various stages in a pre-arranged fashion. The models of theological reflection, which will be considered in this session, should be seen as explanatory models. They provide a way of talking about the complex process of doing theological reflection. In addition, they provide ways of structuring our thinking about an experience, and offer ways of explaining to others, how we have been thinking about particular experiences.

What men differ